I fly several times a year, much of it international. I know my fate, when flying, is totally out of my control and I accept that. In fact I was flying this last Christmas Day from Seattle to Austin, Texas. After landing, I found out about the attempted bombing of Flight 253, and was thankful my wife and I were safe. I was also thankful for the courageous passengers and crew of 253, as well as the many people in the airline industry and government who watch out for our safety and security. There is no doubt in my mind that since 9/11, without the efforts of those folks, we would have had many more incidents. However, given the Christmas event, it is important for the general public, as well as those who provide our security, to understand whether we are doing what is actually needed. We also need to understand whether we are out-thinking those who wish to harm us.
There are about 900 international flights entering the U.S. and more than 28,000 total flights in the U.S. every day. That puts the number of passengers who have to be screened on the order of several million per day. Providing security for that number of people and flights is a huge task. Those of us who fly feel that impact in the form of long lines and sometimes seemingly new and bizarre procedures. For example, no one had to remove their shoes prior to Richard Reid’s unsuccessful bombing attempt. The fact is, as the threat changes our defenses have to adjust as well. Those trying to take down an airliner are on the offensive and look for weak spots in our defense. They will devise new methods to accomplish their aims, but our security systems seem designed to counter threats that have already been attempted. Our security systems also employ a layered approach and use a variety of techniques to uncover a plot. Intelligence gathering and no-fly lists are examples of additional layers to the passenger and baggage inspection procedures in place at airports. Clearly in the Christmas event, both inspection and intelligence broke down.
There was a breakdown of the post-event protocols as well. CNN reports other airliners that were still in the air were not notified of the event, which was a violation of federal requirements (and common sense). The 9/11 attack involved multiple airliners; the notification is intended to give aircrews information they need in case we are under another coordinated multiple-plane attack. The first officer quoted by CNN, Steve Danyluk, said he was “justifiably furious” at the lack of notification and noted that “gaping holes in our response have been exposed...” Danyluk also pointed out that billions of dollars were spent subsequent to 9/11 to provide notification, and he questions why the system wasn’t used. Unlike his experience as a military pilot, he postulated the government failed to run tests and simulations of non-military disaster response systems which would uncover flaws and disconnects. His point is excellent.
My concern is that common sense and meaningful leadership is missing in our government and security institutions. I don’t want to hear that protocols were followed and the system worked. Clearly those are now known myths exposed by what happened in the real world. The system is clearly broken, unfortunately in a number of ways. Our leaders need to stop playing blame-ball, listen to the professionals and fix it. My family, friends, neighbors and all the trusting souls I fly with deserve honesty, integrity and action by our government. No other course of action is acceptable.
Comments (0)
David Camp //Wed, Jan 06, 2010, 6:03 pm
In a Federal Government where incompetence is rewarded (George Tenet, e.g.), and there is no accountability nor consequence for not doing your job, this kind of thing is bound to happen.
Add to this a secret service cluster-frap of overlapping jurisdictions and freelancing racketeers, corrupted by profiteering private interests and infiltrated by foreign spies at every level - it’s surprising that intelligence of any value is available.
Nope - it’s easier to layer on another inconvenience to the poor schmucks who pay for all this. It wouldn’t surprise me if the TSA soon requires all passengers to strip down to nothing and wear a government issue paper jump suit to fly. Call it Guantanamo lite. But you have to pay for your food.
Paul de Armond //Sat, Jan 09, 2010, 8:28 am
This whole subject is more deserving of a post (which I’ll probably do in the future) as opposed to a long comment. But here it goes anyway. The terrorism issue is seriously clouded by a lack of understanding and a history of unrealistic policy decisions. This is nothing new and probably won’t get much better.
First and foremost, the notion of complete security is an utter chimera. If we want complete security, we’d better be prepared to live in the equivalent of a Supermax prison facility.
The purpose of security programs is to diminish the risk and make attacks as difficult as possible.
One starting place is to accurately assess the risk. The United States has had exactly three domestic incidents of mass casualty terrorism in the last 100 years: The 1924 Wall Street bombing, The Oklahoma City Bombing and the 9/11 attacks. As Bruce Hoffman pointed out in the late 1990s, the risk of being harmed in a terrorist attack is less than the risk to dog owners of being savaged by their pets.
The difference is that terrorist violence gets massive amounts of publicity and people getting attacked by their pets gets virtually none.
The second requirement is to accurately assess the source of the attacks. Even restricting ourselves to just the period from 9/11 to the present, the vast majority of domestic attacks on US citizens (both completed and prevented) has not involved foreigners, but Americans. The vast number of incidents in the US were the work of domestic extremists. On this criterion alone, US anti-terrorism policy is deeply and seriously flawed.
One approach to getting a grip on where the threat is coming from is the maintenance of terrorism databases that list every single incident with the pertinent details. One such database is the RAND/St Andrews terrorism database, originally created by Bruce Hoffman and Magnus Ranstorp.
The picture that emerges is very different from the hype and buzz thrashed out in the popular media. Unfortunately, this sort of education requires reading books rather than watching thrillers on video. As such, it appears to be beyond the grasp of both public and policy makers.
If we wish to approach terrorism as a policy issue, the first step is to educate ourselves about the facts. The second is to evaluate risks posed by terrorists and the benefits and drawbacks of current policies. The third is consider the history of past policies and evaluate their effectiveness.
A republic should consider different policies than authoritarian states. Or just get down to it, throw in the towel and embrace massacre, torture and a police state. Enough of these half measure: fly naked, shoot on sight and don’t ask any questions.
The Way I See It - Flying Blind
Wed, Jan 06, 2010, 6:59 am // Ham Hayes
I fly several times a year, much of it international. I know my fate, when flying, is totally out of my control and I accept that. In fact I was flying this last Christmas Day from Seattle to Austin, Texas. After landing, I found out about the attempted bombing of Flight 253, and was thankful my wife and I were safe. I was also thankful for the courageous passengers and crew of 253, as well as the many people in the airline industry and government who watch out for our safety and security. There is no doubt in my mind that since 9/11, without the efforts of those folks, we would have had many more incidents. However, given the Christmas event, it is important for the general public, as well as those who provide our security, to understand whether we are doing what is actually needed. We also need to understand whether we are out-thinking those who wish to harm us.
There are about 900 international flights entering the U.S. and more than 28,000 total flights in the U.S. every day. That puts the number of passengers who have to be screened on the order of several million per day. Providing security for that number of people and flights is a huge task. Those of us who fly feel that impact in the form of long lines and sometimes seemingly new and bizarre procedures. For example, no one had to remove their shoes prior to Richard Reid’s unsuccessful bombing attempt. The fact is, as the threat changes our defenses have to adjust as well. Those trying to take down an airliner are on the offensive and look for weak spots in our defense. They will devise new methods to accomplish their aims, but our security systems seem designed to counter threats that have already been attempted. Our security systems also employ a layered approach and use a variety of techniques to uncover a plot. Intelligence gathering and no-fly lists are examples of additional layers to the passenger and baggage inspection procedures in place at airports. Clearly in the Christmas event, both inspection and intelligence broke down.
There was a breakdown of the post-event protocols as well. CNN reports other airliners that were still in the air were not notified of the event, which was a violation of federal requirements (and common sense). The 9/11 attack involved multiple airliners; the notification is intended to give aircrews information they need in case we are under another coordinated multiple-plane attack. The first officer quoted by CNN, Steve Danyluk, said he was “justifiably furious” at the lack of notification and noted that “gaping holes in our response have been exposed...” Danyluk also pointed out that billions of dollars were spent subsequent to 9/11 to provide notification, and he questions why the system wasn’t used. Unlike his experience as a military pilot, he postulated the government failed to run tests and simulations of non-military disaster response systems which would uncover flaws and disconnects. His point is excellent.
My concern is that common sense and meaningful leadership is missing in our government and security institutions. I don’t want to hear that protocols were followed and the system worked. Clearly those are now known myths exposed by what happened in the real world. The system is clearly broken, unfortunately in a number of ways. Our leaders need to stop playing blame-ball, listen to the professionals and fix it. My family, friends, neighbors and all the trusting souls I fly with deserve honesty, integrity and action by our government. No other course of action is acceptable.
David Camp // Wed, Jan 06, 2010, 6:03 pm
In a Federal Government where incompetence is rewarded (George Tenet, e.g.), and there is no accountability nor consequence for not doing your job, this kind of thing is bound to happen.
Add to this a secret service cluster-frap of overlapping jurisdictions and freelancing racketeers, corrupted by profiteering private interests and infiltrated by foreign spies at every level - it’s surprising that intelligence of any value is available.
Nope - it’s easier to layer on another inconvenience to the poor schmucks who pay for all this. It wouldn’t surprise me if the TSA soon requires all passengers to strip down to nothing and wear a government issue paper jump suit to fly. Call it Guantanamo lite. But you have to pay for your food.
Paul de Armond // Sat, Jan 09, 2010, 8:28 am
This whole subject is more deserving of a post (which I’ll probably do in the future) as opposed to a long comment. But here it goes anyway. The terrorism issue is seriously clouded by a lack of understanding and a history of unrealistic policy decisions. This is nothing new and probably won’t get much better.
First and foremost, the notion of complete security is an utter chimera. If we want complete security, we’d better be prepared to live in the equivalent of a Supermax prison facility.
The purpose of security programs is to diminish the risk and make attacks as difficult as possible.
One starting place is to accurately assess the risk. The United States has had exactly three domestic incidents of mass casualty terrorism in the last 100 years: The 1924 Wall Street bombing, The Oklahoma City Bombing and the 9/11 attacks. As Bruce Hoffman pointed out in the late 1990s, the risk of being harmed in a terrorist attack is less than the risk to dog owners of being savaged by their pets.
The difference is that terrorist violence gets massive amounts of publicity and people getting attacked by their pets gets virtually none.
The second requirement is to accurately assess the source of the attacks. Even restricting ourselves to just the period from 9/11 to the present, the vast majority of domestic attacks on US citizens (both completed and prevented) has not involved foreigners, but Americans. The vast number of incidents in the US were the work of domestic extremists. On this criterion alone, US anti-terrorism policy is deeply and seriously flawed.
One approach to getting a grip on where the threat is coming from is the maintenance of terrorism databases that list every single incident with the pertinent details. One such database is the RAND/St Andrews terrorism database, originally created by Bruce Hoffman and Magnus Ranstorp.
The picture that emerges is very different from the hype and buzz thrashed out in the popular media. Unfortunately, this sort of education requires reading books rather than watching thrillers on video. As such, it appears to be beyond the grasp of both public and policy makers.
If we wish to approach terrorism as a policy issue, the first step is to educate ourselves about the facts. The second is to evaluate risks posed by terrorists and the benefits and drawbacks of current policies. The third is consider the history of past policies and evaluate their effectiveness.
A republic should consider different policies than authoritarian states. Or just get down to it, throw in the towel and embrace massacre, torture and a police state. Enough of these half measure: fly naked, shoot on sight and don’t ask any questions.